Slovenia may be a small country, but its position inside the European Union, NATO and the Schengen area makes it an important target for foreign intelligence services. A new investigation into espionage and foreign influence in Slovenia examines who may be collecting information, what they are looking for and how foreign intelligence networks attempt to gain access and influence inside the country. Former Slovenian intelligence officials say foreign services are interested not only in classified information, but also in political influence, economic connections and access to people who can affect important decisions. Slovenia’s size can make this particularly significant because political, business, academic and research circles are relatively closely connected, potentially making it easier for foreign operatives to build networks and establish relationships.
According to former SOVA director Rajko Kozmelj, Slovenia is regularly exposed to intelligence activity because of the information available through its membership in European and transatlantic institutions. Foreign services can use the country as a source of political, military and economic information, while Slovenia can also serve as a platform for activities directed toward other countries or international organizations. Russian intelligence activity has featured prominently in several known cases. One example involves Ivan Popov, who presented himself as a correspondent for Russia’s TASS news agency and later came under scrutiny from Austrian authorities, which concluded that he was allegedly a Russian intelligence officer. Before moving to Austria, Popov had also worked in Slovenia and interviewed then Prime Minister Marjan Šarec in 2019. Other cases mentioned include Russian intelligence activity involving Sergei Nikolayevich Pozdnyakov and Austrian colonel Martin Möller, who was accused of providing European classified information to Russian military intelligence.
The investigation also revisits the arrest of a Russian couple in Slovenia in 2022 and the case of Sergei Lemešev, a former deputy Russian military attaché who was declared an undesirable person by Slovenia’s Foreign Ministry in March 2024 after Slovenian authorities suspected him of working for Russian intelligence. Another major case discussed is the Black Cube affair, which became linked to Slovenia’s domestic political environment and raised questions about the use of private intelligence and surveillance operations in political conflicts. Former intelligence officials described the affair as one of the most significant espionage related scandals in independent Slovenia, while also stressing that important questions remain unanswered, including who commissioned the operation. The case illustrates how foreign intelligence methods, private investigators and political interests can sometimes overlap, making it difficult for the public to understand where legitimate political competition ends and covert influence begins.
Another issue highlighted by the investigation involves Viktorija Krivolucka, a Russian born Slovenian citizen who is known to be close to President Nataša Pirc Musar. Questions have been raised about possible security risks surrounding her relationship with the president, although the article does not establish that Krivolucka is a spy. Kozmelj specifically said that there is currently no basis to describe her as an intelligence operative, while arguing that additional security checks could help remove doubts and ensure the safety of the president, who is also commander in chief of Slovenia’s armed forces. Former security officials also stressed that people who regularly have access to senior political figures should be subject to continuing security assessments rather than relying only on checks conducted years earlier. The broader message from Slovenia’s intelligence experts is that espionage is not simply about secret documents or dramatic undercover operations. It can involve relationships, influence, access to decision makers, information gathering and attempts to shape public opinion, making foreign intelligence activity a security challenge that can remain largely invisible until a particular case is exposed.
